#### The Measure-and-Reprogram Technique 2.0:

#### Multi-Round Fiat-Shamir and More





Research Center for Quantum Software

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


## Introduction

- Proving *Fiat-Shamir* digital signatures and ZK proof systems secure against quantum attackers
- Secure in the *Quantum Random-Oracle Model* (QROM)
- Extending an existing QROM technique to a larger class of applications, notably
  - Multi-round Fiat-Shamir signatures (Example: MQDSS)
  - Bulletproofs
  - Sequential-OR Proofs
- Proving tightness


## Quantum Random-Oracle Model

- We model the public hash function as an external random-oracle
- All parties have quantum query access, which means that
  - The function cannot be computed locally
  - Parties can query a superposition of inputs



### Main results


• Multi-input reprogrammability of the QROM:



$$\frac{\Pr[\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}_{\circ} \wedge V(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{H}(\mathbf{x}), z)]}{O(q^{2n})} \leq \Pr\left[\overline{\mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{x}_{\circ} \wedge V(\overline{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{\Theta}, \overline{z})\right]$$

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## Main results

• Security of multi-round Fiat-Shamir in the QROM:


$$ADV_{FS[\Pi_n]} \le O(q^{2n}) \cdot ADV_{\Pi_n}$$

for any 2n+1-round public-coin proof system  $\Pi_n$ 


- Tightness:
  - For typical 3-round schemes, there exists a FS attack that boosts the best interactive adversary by a factor  $q^2$
  - The attack can be extended to an artificial multi-round scheme. This attack boosts the adversary's success by  $n^{-2n}q^{2n}$


# Outline of the talk


- Fiat-Shamir transformation
- How measure-and-reprogram 1.0 is applied
- Multi-round Fiat-Shamir; what we need
- Proof idea for multi-input reprogrammability
- Another application; sequential OR-proofs




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
V(pk, com, H(pk||com), resp)

$$(pk, sk) \leftarrow KeyGen \qquad pk$$


$$\underset{ch = H(m||pk||com)}{\texttt{M}} \underbrace{(m||com||resp)}_{H(m||pk||com)} \underbrace{pk}_{H(m||pk||com)}$$

V(pk, com, H(m||pk||com), resp)


#### Measure-and-reprogram 1.0 [DFMS19]




$$\frac{\Pr\left[x = x_{\circ} \land V(x, H(x), z)\right]}{O(q^2)} - \epsilon_{x_{\circ}} \le \Pr\left[\overline{x} = x_{\circ} \land V(\overline{x}, \Theta, \overline{z})\right]$$





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


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




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


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


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
- There exist 2n+1 round public coin interactive proof systems, for constant or logarithmic n.
- Generalized 'multi-round' FS transform takes away the interaction.




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



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






$$\frac{\Pr\left[\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}_{\circ} \land V(\mathbf{x}, H(\mathbf{x}), z)\right]}{?} - ? \leq \Pr\left[\overline{\mathbf{x}} = \overline{\mathbf{x}}_{\circ} \land V(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}, \overline{z})\right]$$

















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$$V(x_1, \Theta_1, x_2, \Theta_2, \ldots, x_n, \Theta_n, z)$$



 $(x_1,\ldots,x_n,z)$ 

$$V(x_1, \Theta_1, x_2, \Theta_2, \ldots, x_n, \Theta_n, z)$$

$$\frac{\Pr\left[x_1 = x_1^{\circ} \wedge V(x_1, H(x_1), z')\right]}{O(q^2)} - \epsilon_{x_1^{\circ}} \le \Pr\left[\overline{x_1} = x_1^{\circ} \wedge V(\overline{x_1}, \Theta_1, z')\right]$$

$$\frac{\Pr\left[\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}_{\circ} \land V(\mathbf{x}, H(\mathbf{x}), z)\right]}{?} - ? \leq \Pr\left[\overline{\mathbf{x}} = \overline{\mathbf{x}}_{\circ} \land V(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}, z)\right]$$

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 $\frac{\Pr\left[x_1 = x_1^{\circ} \land x_2 = x_2^{\circ} \land V(x_1, x_2, H(x_1), H(x_2), z'')\right]}{O(q^4)} - \epsilon_{x_1^{\circ}} - \epsilon_{x_2^{\circ}} \le \Pr\left[\overline{x_1} = x_1^{\circ} \land \overline{x_2} = x_2^{\circ} \land V(\overline{x_1}, \overline{x_2}, \Theta_1, \Theta_2, z'')\right]$ 

$$\frac{\Pr\left[\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}_{\circ} \land V(\mathbf{x}, H(\mathbf{x}), z)\right]}{?} - ? \leq \Pr\left[\overline{\mathbf{x}} = \overline{\mathbf{x}}_{\circ} \land V(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}, z)\right]$$

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$$\frac{\Pr\left[x_1 = x_1^{\circ} \land V(x_1, H(x_1), z')\right]}{O(q^2)} - \epsilon_{x_1^{\circ}} \le \Pr\left[\overline{x_1} = x_1^{\circ} \land V(\overline{x_1}, \Theta_1, z')\right]$$


$$\frac{\Pr\left[x_1 = x_1^{\circ} \land x_2 = x_2^{\circ} \land V(x_1, x_2, H(x_1), H(x_2), z'')\right]}{O(q^4)} - \epsilon_{x_1^{\circ}} - \epsilon_{x_2^{\circ}} \le \Pr\left[\overline{x_1} = x_1^{\circ} \land \overline{x_2} = x_2^{\circ} \land V(\overline{x_1}, \overline{x_2}, \Theta_1, \Theta_2, z'')\right]$$

$$\frac{\Pr\left[\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}_{\circ} \land V(\mathbf{x}, H(\mathbf{x}), z)\right]}{O(q^{2n})} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \epsilon_{x_{i}^{\circ}} \leq \Pr\left[\overline{\mathbf{x}} = \overline{\mathbf{x}}_{\circ} \land V(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}, z)\right]$$

$$\frac{\Pr[x_{1}]}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{x_{i}^{\circ}}\epsilon_{x_{i}^{\circ}} \leq negl(\eta)} \sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{x_{i}^{\circ}}\epsilon_{x_{i}^{\circ}} \leq negl(\eta)$$

$$\sum_{\mathbf{x}_{\circ}}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\epsilon_{x_{i}^{\circ}} \leq negl(\eta)$$

$$\frac{\Pr[\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}_{\circ} \land V(\mathbf{x}, H(\mathbf{x}), z)]}{O(q^{2n})} - \sum_{i=1}^{n}\epsilon_{x_{i}^{\circ}} \leq \Pr[\overline{\mathbf{x}} = \overline{\mathbf{x}}_{\circ} \land V(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{\Theta}, z)]$$



$$\frac{\Pr\left[x_1 = x_1^{\circ} \land V(x_1, H(x_1), z')\right]}{O(q^2)} - \epsilon_{x_1^{\circ}} \le \Pr\left[\overline{x_1} = x_1^{\circ} \land V(\overline{x_1}, \Theta_1, z')\right]$$

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#### Measure-and-reprogram 2.0

$$\frac{\Pr\left[x_1 = x_1^{\circ} \land V(x_1, H(x_1), z')\right]}{O(q^2)}$$


 $\frac{\Pr\left[x_1 = x_1^{\circ} \land x_2 = x_2^{\circ} \land V(x_1, x_2, H(x_1), H(x_2), z'')\right]}{O(q^4)}$ 


$$\leq \Pr\left[\overline{x_1} = x_1^{\circ} \wedge V(\overline{x_1}, \Theta_1, z')\right]$$

$$\leq \Pr\left[\overline{x_1} = x_1^{\circ} \land \overline{x_2} = x_2^{\circ} \land V(\overline{x_1}, \overline{x_2}, \Theta_1, \Theta_2, z'')\right]$$


$$\frac{\Pr\left[\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}_{\circ} \land V(\mathbf{x}, H(\mathbf{x}), z)\right]}{O(q^{2n})}$$

 $\leq \Pr\left[\overline{\mathbf{x}} = \overline{\mathbf{x}}_{\circ} \land V(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{\Theta}, z)\right]$ 





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


$$(x_1,\ldots,x_n,z)$$

Solution: include previous challenge in the hash:

$$ch_1 = H(0, x, com_1)$$
  
 $ch_i = H(i - 1, ch_{i-1}, com_i)$ 

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 $(x_1,\ldots,x_n,z)$ 

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# Sequential OR-proofs

- Introduced by Liu, Wei and Wong in 2004
  - Proves at least one of two statements x1,x2 is true, without revealing which one:

$$V(x_1, com_1, H(com_2), resp_1)$$
$$V(x_2, com_2, H(com_1), resp_2)$$



#### Thank you for listening. Questions?